A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION LAW REGIMES OF INDIA AND USA by Diksha Singh

Author: Diksha Singh, Student at National Institute of Securities Market, Maharashtra.

ABSTRACT

The  competition  law  regime  in  India  is  at  a nascent  stage.  Recently  in  2019  India  has completed a decade of enforcement of the Competition Law Act (2002), which was enforced in 2009. The US competition law regime is as old as the Sherman Act of 1890. The US being a developed economy has a much older and mature competition regime than India. The author seeks to compare and critically analyze the competition law frameworks of both the countries in terms of the statutory framework, the institutional framework, application and enforcement of laws, good and bad characteristics of both the systems. The author also seeks to analyze the loopholes in the Indian Competition law framework and make further recommendations for India to learn and incorporate some best practices from the US system and thus eliminating the loopholes. I am optimistic that India will one day complete the cumbersome process of creating a competition law regime that would prove a model for the rest of the world. The parliament of India has already provided the required raw material that already has the potential to produce the result.[1]

US ANTITRUST STATUTES AND INSTITUTIONS

A- STATUTES:

The US antitrust laws are a part of its original regime and the major component of the federal economic regulatory scheme. Setting limits on collusive and predatory exercise and monopolistic practices that unregulated markets frequently produce, the antitrust laws in US seek to safeguard free market and healthy competition among enterprises[2]. Antitrust laws in general and the Sherman Act specifically are magna carta of free enterprise, with the aim of preserving the economic freedom and free- enterprise system.[3]

The antitrust laws were made for eliminating marketplace competition. The marketplace competitions include eliminating practices such as price-rigging, price fixing, tying agreements, monopolization, mergers and acquisitions which are anti-competitive in nature, price- discrimination, creation of illegal cartels, and many other practices due to which there is a restraint to healthy competition in the open market between different enterprises. Various important antitrust laws of the US are as follows-:

• The Sherman Act, 1890

This Act was made by the US congress so as to exclude the oligopolistic cartels which were trying to act collusively rather than competing in a healthy manner in the market. The key provisions of the Act are contained in section 1 and 2 of the Act.[4]

Section 1 is read as “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony,[5] and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” [6] The courts have interpreted this section using two approaches namely the ‘per se rule’ and the ‘rule of reason’[ 7] [8] Section 2 seeks to ‘prohibit monopolization and attempts to monopolize’. This section basically prohibits using a bad behaviour or abusive conduct to become a monopoly and prohibition from such bad conduct if an enterprise is already a monopoly. It is to be noted that this Act does not prohibit monopoly but it prohibits the exercise of monopolistic powers. [9]

• The Clayton Act, 1914 –:

The Clayton Act contains several provisions for anti-competitive practices such as- Section 3 talks about tying agreements that is selling of the goods and commodities on some terms and conditions which may reduce competition and create monopoly.[10] Section 4 provides that anyone harmed by anything forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue in federal court regardless of the amount in controversy. A successful plaintiff is entitled to recover three times his actual damages (treble damages) as well as his costs of suit, “including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”[11] Further, section 7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions “where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly”[12]. Section 8[13] talks about Interlocking Directorates which restrains a person from being a Director or a member of Board of Directors, of two competing corporations at the same time.[14]

• The Hart-Scott- Rodino Act, 1976-:

This Act was in the form of amendment to the Clayton Act. This Act made provisions for the enterprises, companies and individuals who seek mergers to provide pre-merger notification to the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice [15] and wait for a period of 30 days for approval. [16]

• Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-:

It prevents vendors from selling identical products to similarly situated consumers, subject to different terms and conditions (such as rates, discounts, rebates, allowances or promotional assistance)[17], provided that the difference is adverse to competition. It prevents the selling in one section of the United States of products at lower prices than in another for the purpose of destroying competition or removing a competitor[18]. Also, this Act prohibits predatory pricing.[19]

•  The Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914-:

Section 5 of the Act establishes the Federal Trade Commission as an authority for regulating the unfair methods of competition in markets through civil remedies. The Attorney General could bring civil actions against the violators for imposition of penalties[20]. The FTC has the same powers as Department of Justice but it also has three unique powers—(1) the power to enforce a statutory prohibition on unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices; (2) the power to obtain a court order temporarily enjoining conduct that violates the antitrust laws by meeting a standard that is less demanding than the standard DOJ must meet to obtain such an order; and, (3) the power to conduct hearings to decide whether a firm has violated the antitrust laws in-house before one of the FTC’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) instead of asking a court to make that decision.[21] [22]

B- INSTITUTIONS

Six major institutions play an important role in the implementation of the Antitrust Laws in the United States of America-

•  Department of Justice-:

The Department of Justice has the exclusive responsibility criminal enforcement of antitrust laws. The Antitrust division of the Department of Justice is responsible for such enforcement. The division is headed by Assistant Attorney General for antitrust. It has its headquarters at Washington DC. It will be a criminal violation if the antitrust laws are violated as stated by the Sherman Act. The DOJ investigates and prosecutes the individuals and companies which are involved in very serious and clear violation of free market laws by illegal means such as cartel activities such as price discrimination, bid-rigging, and market-allocation agreements. However, the Government must prove a criminal intent in order to have a anyone liable. The department is staffed by lawyers and economists whom have a good understanding of microeconomics and law. The lawyers run their own grand juries and prosecute their own criminal actions.[23]. After conducting investigation and the determination of the charges the DOJ shall ask the Federal District court to impose civil and criminal liability according to the provisions of law. Also, when the government makes a civil investigative demand the DOJ can conduct an investigation into civil matters where the charges are less serious and less illegal and very hard to prove.[24]

•  The Federal Trade Commission-:

The FTC is an independent regulatory authority. It consists of five commissioners, one of whom is the chairperson. They have a tenure of seven years. Its major object is to administer the provisions of FTC Act, wherein section 5 clearly makes unfair methods of competition and unfair & deceptive practices as prohibited by the Act. The Act also enforces certain unfair practices which seem but are not clear violation of the antitrust laws. The FTC is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, while it does not directly enforce the Sherman Act. It works in collaboration with the DOJ for deciding the pre-merger guidelines according to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.[25] It is to be noted that the FTC has the power only to seek civil remedies.

• State Attorney General-:

The Attorney Generals of different states have different powers and duties. Section 4C of the Claytons Act provides them the power to bring actions against parties for civil damages by invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction of the respective state antitrust laws. Some can even bring actions for criminal liabilities under their respective state antitrust laws while others have no such power[26]. Several State Attorneys can also join together in collaboration and sue for the violation of antitrust laws, example in the case against the Microsoft where allegations were levelled for monopolization. [27]

• Private parties-:

Private parties are also one of the weapons for the enforcement of antitrust laws. They can file a complaint in the Federal District Court and seek to enforce civil remedies. If the private party successfully proves the charges in the court then it shall get three times the amount of the damages incurred by them as well as the court fees incurred shall be reimbursed by the party at default. [28]

•  Juries-

Jury means a panel of six to twelve unbiased and random people who usually do not have any knowledge of economics and laws. The jury members shall try the case for civil antitrust cases as well as the criminal antitrust cases against the defending parties. [29]

• Courts-

The Federal Courts have the duty and responsibility to enforce civil and criminal remedies in the cases referred to it by the FTC and the DOJ. They also have the responsibility of reviewing and scrutinising the actions taken by the Federal Trade Commission so as to determine any anomalies or false motivation. The courts do consist of Judges who are appoint for their entire lifetime by the President. They are usually experienced and good lawyers who are recommended by the US senate, they do not have any formal training in the field of microeconomics and antitrust laws.[30]

PROCEDURES USED TO IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE ANTITRUST LAWS IN U.S.

A- CRIMINAL CASES

The Department of Justice is the only authority which is responsible to conduct investigation in criminal violations related to antitrust laws and thereafter ask the Federal District Court to impose penalties upon the violators. The defendants are entitled to be tried by a Grand Jury investigation where first the jury issued summons in the form of document subpoenas for the defendants to produce all the required documents through the prosecutor. Also summons can be issued for presenting testimonies to individuals. After examining the documents and taking the testimonies, the prosecutors present their pleas and trial begins. The Supreme Court has ruled in the case of United States v. Brooker that the judge can even increase the sentence of a defendant on the basis of facts which the jury could not find. The sentence can be increased by applying the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The DOJ has also started leniency programs for the corporations and individuals who themselves come forward and disclose the violations of antitrust laws done by them. [31]

B- CIVIL CASES

The Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, private parties and Attorney Generals enjoy the right to seek civil remedies against antitrust law violations done by corporations or firms. The complaint can be filed in the Federal District Court, where the judge determines whether the defendant violated the antitrust law or not. Usually it takes years for such cases to be registered and if in case is referred to a jury then the examination, testimony and other procedure become tedious and highly technical. The claims and submissions made in such cases is usually of a very technical nature and requires field experts at times for making a sound examination and inquiry into the issues. The Federal Trade Commission has the option of conducting a trial which is in-house before the Administrative Law Judge. However, such trials are also lengthy, time consuming and very expensive. The judges need to carve out a middle path so as to adjudicate such cases more speedily and effectively. To the authors suggestion it can be done if the parties are allowed to made oral submissions and written testimonies at the very beginning when the case is filed, this will in turn save a lot of courts time and thus a remedy can be rendered much earlier without any further delay. [32]

C- MERGER AND ACQUISITION

The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are responsible for monitoring and scrutinising the mergers and acquisitions taking place between firms and corporations. Section 7 of the Claytons Act contains the provision which prohibits the mergers and acquisition in any line of commerce where it shall affect the free competition in the market to a larger extent. Section 7A of the said Act contains the provision relating to pre-merger of firms and corporations. This provision is also known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act. The firms/corporations with minimum asset valuations or sale valuations shall have to report the merger to the FTC or the DOJ, thereafter an investigation shall be conducted by either of the authority which will require a 30-day time. The HSR Act also has listed twelve kinds of transactions which are exempt from reporting. The firms proposing merger shall be given an opportunity to explain as to how such merger shall not violate the antitrust laws. The regulators have the power to block the proposed transaction and also suggest certain alterations for the same. However, if the regulators do not challenge the transaction within 30 days, the firms can assume their approval. The regulators can notify the firms that they will oppose the transaction unless the firm proactively take steps by themselves to eliminate certain concerns which are in violation of the antitrust laws. Usually it requires the firms to do disinvestment of certain assets so that they may only have a small share in the market and not become a monopoly. Even after an opposition from the regulators if the firm desires to complete the transaction then the DOJ can seek either for a permanent injunction or a temporary injunction against the merger from the court till the matter is fully decided [33]. The party which seeks injunction will have to prove certain contentions- 1- that an irreparable damage shall occur with no sufficient remedy in law if such merger is implemented; 2- public interest requires the granting of such injunction; 3- the balance of harm favours the movant; 4- the merits of the case favours the claim. The FTC can seek a temporary injunction and must prove that “weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest”. Unlike DOJ the FTC does not have to prove that such merger will cause irreparable damage with no sufficient remedy available in law. [34]

D- INTERPRETATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAWS

The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act contain very wide and indefinite provisions, which can have many interpretations. Both the statutes contain provisions which forbids contracts which are hindrance for free trade in the economy, other conducts which are forbidden are price- discrimination, hard core cartels, rig-bidding, tying agreements, attempting to create a monopoly by unfair or illegal means or when a monopoly firm tries to secure its position through illegal means, mergers and acquisitions when they result in reducing the competition in free market and thus monopolizing their position. Thus, the DOP and the FTC has to keep interpreting the uncertain provisions of the antitrust laws so as to keep pace with the changing needs of time and situation. Except for the cases related to merger and acquisition the only source available for the interpretation of the antitrust laws are the judicial pronouncements and interpretations made from case-to-case basis. There are many instances where there are no judicial opinions available on the given facts of the case and if the case laws are available, they are age long which serve no purpose in present times. [35]The DOJ and FTC jointly issues guidelines policy statements relating to the implementation of laws relating to mergers and acquisitions. Both the agencies publish guidelines relating to the analytical methods and tools they use to approve or oppose a merger and acquisition of a firms or corporation. The courts have no option of interpreting the guidelines but only to apply the guidelines as it is to the cases. However, in other cases the courts are free to interpret various provisions of the antitrust laws and apply them to real time issues. [36]

GOOD AND BAD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE US ANTITRUST LAW REGIME

A- GOOD CHARACTERISTICS-

• The antitrust statutes in the US contain wide and indefinite provisions to forbid anti- competitive practices. The firms and corporations can be restrained from such practices only when some government entity such as the DOJ or the FTC or the Federal Court examines and determines of such practices to have the effect of reducing the free market competition or creating a monopoly by illegal means which would in turn have an adverse effect on the market economy. The courts only restrain such unreasonable practices which can restrain free trade, or create monopoly through illegal means or have the effect of using illegal and unfair means to keep their position secure as a monopoly. The statutes do not prohibit monopolies but the use of unfair means by the firms to become a monopoly or to retain a monopolistic position. Thus, the legitimate attempts made by the firms become a monopoly by enhancing the product quality, reducing the manufacturing costs, and reducing the cost of goods and services they provide, are highly encouraged for the healthy functioning of the free market economy[37].
• The US consists of a strong regulatory framework for enforcing antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and Competition Bureau of the Federal Trade Commission have a very strong staffing with lawyers and other experts in the field of microeconomics and antitrust law enforcement. They issue policy statements and guidelines from time to time disclosing their methods and tools used while evaluating the legality of mergers and acquisitions. However, the judges of the Federal District Court are not experts in the field of microeconomics and antitrust laws and are only good lawyers, still they play an important role in antitrust law enforcement along with the DOJ and the FTC. The courts are aided by the DOJ and the
• Both the DOJ and FTC can enter into antitrust These are called consent decrees at the Department of Justice and consent orders at the Federal Trade Commission. The DOJ entered its first settlement decree in 1906 in the case of United States v. Otis Elevator Company [38], thereafter it started using consent decrees with a much greater frequency after the coming into force of the Clayton Act of 1914, wherein section 5A says “that in no case shall a government negotiated consent decree, entered before testimony is taken, be available as prima facie evidence to assist private parties in recovering treble damages for injuries caused by the defendant’s activities.” [39]This encouraged the defendants for settlements rather than to continue the litigation and loose the case. This helped the companies to save the resources, its future clients, and also its goodwill. [40]Going by the statistics, with such settlement incentives between 1905 and 1909 almost 30% of the civil antitrust cases of DOJ were settled, and thereafter it rose to 73% in between 1910 to 1954. [41]Till today the percentage of settlement agreements in cases have increased. The consent settlements frameworks are almost same in DOJ and FTC, the only difference is that in case of DOJ the settlement is reviewed by the Federal district Court on the ground whether the settlement was in public interest, whereas in cases of FTC no such determination of public interest is made by the court and only civil monetary compensation is levied.
• The antitrust law framework contains provisions for imposing hefty damages upon the party who is involved in violation of free market laws. The courts impose three times the amount of damages involved in the case and also the losing party has to reimburse the court fee and litigation expenses to the aggrieved party if the party is a private individual. This practice deters a party from violating the antitrust laws as it would cost much more than the amount of profit they could have made by such unfair practices.
• The DOJ runs two different leniency programs namely the corporate leniency program and individual leniency program. These programs are run for the corporates and individuals who themselves come forward and report their illegal activities having an adverse effect on free market competition. Such reporting saves them from criminal charges being imposed upon them.
• The manner of examination and evaluation of mergers and acquisitions is another noteworthy feature of the US antitrust law regime. During the initial years of implementation of the antitrust law regime the courts refused to apply antitrust laws to mergers and acquisitions as in the case of Northern Securities Company v. United States (1904). [42] Thereafter for many years the courts declared many mergers as against the law. Although in reality they had the potential to improve the performance of the market economy [43] Thereafter, from 1973 onwards the situation changed when the US courts started experiencing major changes in its composition and various judges who has good understanding of microeconomics and other market laws than the previous judges. This in turn improved the rationality and the quality of decisions on cases of mergers and acquisitions. Also, because such cases were brought before the courts through the DOJ and FTC who have already done their expert investigations, the courts have become reluctant in making errors in decision making now. Almost 97% cases of mergers and acquisitions survive the 30 days investigation and review period. Rest 3% cases are investigated by the agencies taking more than 30 days and requiring more compliances from the firms. Thereafter such mergers can be opposed in the courts or the firms can even enter a settlement with the DOJ or the FTC. [44]
• Also, the practice of issuing merger and acquisition policy statements and guidelines by the DOJ and FTC has an effect of increasing transparency and accountability between the market player firms and government procedures. The government agencies disclose all the relevant guidelines relating to the analytical methods used to evaluate the merger effects on the free market competition.

B- BAD CHARACTERISTICS-

• The Federal Courts in US rely more on the interpretations of the antitrust statutes, policy statements and other guidelines issued by the DOJ and FTC, which have good effect on the legal governance. Because the policies are greatly aided and have a strong expert backing of the government agencies the courts do not find any difficulty in applying such laws and policies in cases brought before them by the DOJ or FTC. Apparently in cases where only private parties are involved only then the lack of expertise of the judges is exposed. They are more prone to make bad decisions or serious errors while deciding cases. This in turn shall have a negative effect on market performance. The lawyers who plead for private parties have to perform the duty to win the case for his client and has got no duty to interpret the policies and statutes in the best interest of the nation. They tend to easily mislead the court on the effective interpretation of the policies and It is only the case involving DOJ and FTC that the decisions are made keeping in view the national interest, because in such cases the private parties cannot mislead the court through their counsels. [45]
• The courts take much more than the desirable amount of time to redress antitrust disputes. It usually takes around 6 months to get the cases listed and further when the case is referred to a jury, the minimum time taken for investigation and testimonies shall at least be 2-3 years to reach the final stage. Overall, it is a long, time driven and a cumbersome process to resolve an antitrust dispute in Looking at the dynamic nature of the US economy the length of time taken to dispose of cases is something which needs much attention. Seeing the case of United States v. Alcoa (1945), which was listed in the year 1937 but it took8 years to get resolved. A market competitor named Alcoa was alleged to monopolize the aluminium market, but in 8 years duration it was observed that it was only left with a tiny market share. The court did not impose penalty on Alcoa saying that the said penalty has been recovered by time during these 8 years. [46] To the opinion of the author if the hearings can be made oral instead of written submissions required by the parties, the cases can be disposed of a much less time duration.
• Also talking about the jury, twelve random members are selected from the public who are unbiased and not related to the parties of the cases in any way. They do not have any expertise in the field of micro economics, and antitrust. These factors further add to delay in court proceedings and also in the disposal of the case.
• Most legal precedents available from past antitrust case decisions cannot be applied to recent cases because there is lack of definite legal principles which apply to similar facts of cases in two different circumstances. Also, the courts are still in the process of developing new equitable principles which can be applied to cases which changing times. Thus, there is more vagueness in the antitrust legal environment which has yet not been addressed.
• Even after more than 100 years of development of US antitrust law regime the courts are prone to make serious errors in decision making and deliver bad results. Due to the lack of expertise of the judges they often tend to made poor reasoning and reach to a bad conclusion. [47] The private parties litigating through their counsels at times show the tendency to lure the court to obscure conclusions which are definitely not good for the free market competition in the economy. For mitigating this issue, the private parties should be restrained for bringing antitrust law violation cases before the courts, it should be only through the DOJ and FTC.
• Till today the cases related to mergers and acquisitions are not decided on merit basis by the Still some firms seeking merger decide to carry on the merger process even after an intimation by the DOJ or FTC that they seek to oppose the same in the court. The temporary injunction taken by the government agencies lasts only till the case is decided on merits. Because the cases usually take a long time to get resolved the firms after losing the case ask for a temporary injunction or they seek settlement with the government agencies.[48]
• The antitrust laws in US are vast and include many patterns of conducts which can be treated detrimental to the competition in free market. At one point of time one cannot precisely determine as to which practices are forbidden and which laws are violated. Even the practicing lawyers find it difficult to interpret the vague provisions of the antitrust The laws are so old and outdated that they do not reflect the thinking of the thought process of the court today[49].

INDIAN COMPETITION LAW STATUTES AND INSTITUTIONS

A- STATUTES-:

Since attaining independence in 1947, India for the better part of half a century thereafter, adopted and followed policies comprising what are known as command-and-control laws, regulations and executive orders. The competition law in India was triggered by Articles 38 and 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy under part IV of Constitution of India. Previously the competition law in India was governed by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. The major objectives of the MRTP Act were – 1- Prevention of concentration of economic power to the common detriment, 2-Control of monopolies, 3- Prohibition of Monopolistic Trade Practices (MTP), 4- Prohibition of Restrictive Trade Practices (RTP) 5-Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices (UTP). [50] However, the MRTP Act failed due to -:

1- Excessive government control of small and big enterprises.

2- Vague and ambiguous law.[51]

3- Implementation of per se rule instead of rule of reason.

4- Under the Act dominance in itself was bad irrespective of the fact whether any party had abused its position or not. [52]

5- It promoted exports at any cost.

6- Failure to regulate anti-competitive practices effectively.[53]

In the context of new economic policy paradigm, India has chosen to enact a new competition law called the Competition Act, 2002. The present Act came into force in order to replace the MRTP Act.[54] After the year 1990, India experienced an increase in the flow of foreign direct investment and a considerable increase in international trade of various goods and services and also a considerable increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the present law has been enacted to adhere the changing needs and changing demands of Indian economy. [55] The main objectives of the Act are-

1- To ensure fair competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which cause appreciable adverse effect on competition in markets in India;

2- Promote and sustain competition in market;

3- Protect the interest of consumers;

4- Ensure the freedom of trade carried on by other participants in market.[56][57]

In order to achieve these objectives the Act prohibits certain practices such as  anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, bid rigging, illegal cartels, and combinations which regulates mergers and acquisition in order to safeguard the competition in the market[58]. In the case of Competition Commission of India v. SAIL, (2010), the supreme court of India held that “the main objective of competition law is to promote economic efficiency using competition as one of the means of assisting the creation of market responsive to consumer preferences”[59]. Further the court highlights the importance of competition law and policy in a free economy must have three types of efficiency namely- allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, and dynamic efficiency.[60]

B- INSTITUTIONS-:

The institutions involved in the enforcement of competition law are-

• Competition Commission of India– Section 8 of the Competition Act 2002 describes the composition of the competition commission as having a chairperson, and not less than two and not less than six other members to be appointed by the central government. The chairperson and every other member shall hold office for a term of five years from the date of appointment.[61] Every member shall handle different divisions under the commission namely the  Administration and co-ordination division, investigation division, economic division, combination division, antitrust division, and legal division. Section 18 of the Act enlists various duties to be performed by the competition commission, some of them are- to promote and sustain competition, to eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, protect the interests of consumers, to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the market. [62]
• Director General- According to section 16 of the Act, the Director General of CCI is appointed by the Central Government. He is responsible for conducting investigations into possible contraventions of the provisions of the Act. Recently the Competition (Amendment) Bill ,2020 has proposed that the appointment of the Director General shall be done by the Commission instead by the Central Government. However, the bill has yet not been passed in the Indian The Director General has all the powers conferred upon the Commission under section 36(2). Section 41 of the Act lists the powers of the Director General elaborately.[63] He has all the powers of a civil court, he can even make a report after his investigation which the commission may consider while deciding the case but not completely bound by it.
• The Competition Appellate Tribunal- In the Competition (Amendment) Act 2007, provision was laid down for the establishment of the Competition Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal hears appeals against the orders passed by the Competition Commission of The Tribunal has the power to decide its own procedure and rationalize the scheme for penalties. It consists of a chairperson and two other members, all of them are appointed by the central government for a period of five years.[64]
• The Supreme Court- According to section 53T of the Act, the Supreme Court has the power to hear appeals against the orders of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, provided the aggrieved party approaches the court within 60 days of the pronouncement of the decision.[65]
• Private Parties- Under section 53N of the Act, the private parties can provide information about some anti-competitive activity going on which can in turn form the basis of inquiry by the Competition Commission of India, however they can recover compensation for any loss from the tribunal. The parties do not have any rights to initiate proceedings for the determination of violation of the competition laws. [66]

ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA

1-  ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS-

Section 3 of the Act deals with two kinds of agreements namely the horizontal agreements and vertical agreements. Any agreements which shall result in having an appreciable adverse effect on the competition in India is forbidden under the Competition Act, 2002. Various factors to be taken into consideration while determining whether an agreement would have an appreciable adverse effect are-

• The agreement directly or indirectly determines the selling and the buying price of goods and services.
• The agreement puts a threshold limit on manufacturing, production, supply, technical development of the goods or services in the market.
• The said agreement results in rig-bidding or collusive-bidding.

All of such conducts come under the category of anti-competitive agreements. However, section 3 also says that the said criteria shall not apply to the joint ventures which enter into agreement just to increase their productivity, supply, technical support, distribution, acquisition and control of services.[67] Tying agreements are also prohibited under section 3 of the said Act however certain tying agreements are permitted provided the seller can tie two products together, the seller must have a sufficient market power, and the tying agreement must not affect an insubstantial amount of commerce in the market. These three conditions were stated in the case of Sonam Sharma v. Apple and ors,2011, which is popularly known as the Apple case, wherein Vodafone and Airtel acted as distributors of iPhone.[68]

2-  ABUSE OF DOMINANCE-

Section 4 of the Act talks about the abuse of dominant position and forbids such activity. Whenever any market player firm or enterprise tries to use its dominant position in the market so as to further following objects (it is called as abuse of dominant position)-:[69]

• Directly or indirectly imposing unfair or discriminatory prices in the purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or services.
• Limiting or restraining the production of goods or provision of services.
• Limiting or restraining technical or scientific or technical development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of consumers.
• Denying market access in any manner.
• Making conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
• Using its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into other relevant market.[70][71]

In the case of Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd & Meru Travel Services Pvt Ltd v. ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd, 2015 [72] the court defined the term “dominant position as a position of economic strength enjoyed by the enterprise in the relevant market, which enables it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market or affect its competitor or consumer or the relevant market in its favour. Such ability of the enterprise to behave independently of competitive forces needs to be assessed in light of all relevant circumstances and the factors enlisted under Section 19(4) of the Act.” [73][74] The High-level Committee on Competition Policy and Law (Raghavan Committee Report of May 2000) states that the[75] key questions for adjudication on abuse of dominance are as follows: (a) How will the practice harm competition? (b) Will it deter or prevent entry? (c) Will it reduce incentives of the firm and its rivals to compete aggressively? (d) Will it provide the dominant firm with an additional capacity to raise prices? (e) Will it prevent investments in research and innovation? (f) Do consumers benefit from lower prices or greater product and service availability?[76][77]

3- REGULATION OF COMBINATIONS-

Section 5 of the Act defines combinations. The CCI may on its own or through the knowledge provide by some source inquire into the acquisition referred in section 5(a), or acquiring control referred to in section 5(b) or merger and amalgamation under section 5(c). the commission shall make a reasonable inquiry into the fact whether the combination has had any appreciable adverse effect on the free market competition. the commission shall take into consideration the factors listed in section 20 for this determination. Also, if the commission fails to conduct any inquiry into combinations within a period of 1 year, then it shall be debarred from conducting it at a later stage.

In particular the combinations are regulated by a separate subsidiary regulation named as- CCI (Procedure in regard to transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011.[78]

4- CIVIL PENALTIES-

The commission has all the powers of a civil court with respect to summoning, examining, discovery and production of documents and receiving evidence on affidavit, and also all the powers contains in sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 42 provides for penalties for the contravention of the orders of the commission which may extend to Rs. 1,00,000/- per day, during which such non-compliance occurs, subject to a maximum of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- (Rs. Ten Crores), as the Commission may determine, or in case if such person fails to pay fine imposed above, or fails to comply the direction, then there is a provision of imprisonment up to three years or fine up to Rs. 25,00,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-five crore), or with both.[79]Section 43 provides for penalty where a party fails to comply with the orders of Director General in terms of section 36(2) and 36(4). Sections 43A talks about the penalty for non-furnishing of information on combinations. Section 44 provides penalty for furnishing false statements or omission to furnish material information. Section 46 is a part of leniency scheme run by the commission where lesser penalty is imposed on a party who makes a full and true disclosure in respect of the alleged violations. It is to be noted that all the sum credited to the commission as penalties shall be in turn credited to the Consolidated Fund of India (section 47). Further it is to be noted that penalties are determined in accordance with section 27 of the Act keeping the legislative intent of the Act in mind and a fair ratio in between the quantum of offence and penalty imposed. [80]

5- CRIMINAL PENALTIES-

The competition Act has no such provision for imposition of criminal penalties for the violation of competition law. The major object of competition law is the protection of consumers, promotion of free market competition without any unfair practices, and promotion of trade. The CCI can only impose monetary penalty for the anti-competitive agreements. However, under section 3 of the Act whenever a party contravenes the conditions, the CCI may pass following orders-

• To withdraw themselves from such agreement that is to cease and desist from such activity,
• Penalty up to 10% of the average turnover of the violator enterprise in the preceding 3 year duration. Also, when the commission finds a cartel activity it can impose a penalty of three times the profit made from the cartel, or 10% of the average turnover in every year of continuation of cartel, whichever is more in amount.
• Modification of the terms and conditions of the agreement.
• Give directions to compulsorily abide by the directions of the commission and pay the penalty imposed.
• Pass any other order as the commission may deem fit[81].

GOOD AND BAD CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPETITION LAW REGIME IN INDIA

A- GOOD CHARACTERISTICS-

• The statutory framework is well drafted and also equipped with the ability to determine effectively as to which conduct shall lead to affect competition and which kinds of conduct are likely to promote a healthy competition regime in the country which in turn strengthens the economy.
• The institutional framework for the enforcement of competition law is under constant progress in order to meet the changing needs of the market Section 17 of the Act provides that the commission can appoint experts and other professionals for the sound functioning of the commission and proper furtherance of its objects. The competition commission has been very active in determining anti-competitive activities in the market through their effective surveillance over the market players. For example in the case of In re: Alleged Cartelization by Cement Manufacturers case, 2012, CCI imposed hefty penalty of Rs. 63.07 billion on 11 cement companies for alleged fixing of prices, supply quantities, and control of market share with an objective to earn illegal profit,[82] also a heavy penalty of Rs. 522 crores was imposed on BCCI in 2013 for the offence of abusing its dominant position[83], similarly Google was fined Rs. 10 crore in 2014 when the giant did not comply with the Director Generals orders of providing certain documents and information.[84]
• The competition law in India forbids private parties from litigating before the competition commission and other courts of general jurisdiction. The judges of the courts lack the required expertise into micro economics and other competition law thus the private parties may through their attorneys or counsels try to lure the court into irrational and erroneous interpretation of laws which may in turn result in bad Thus, not allowing private parties to litigate is a welcome step.
• The competition law enforcement institution in India, that is the Competition commission of India has the power to determine its own procedures and rules unlike the federal courts in the US which do not possess such rule making powers. Having such crucial power the commission can accordingly frame rules and lay down procedures which are suited best to accomplish their tasks and dispose of cases in a speedy manner.
• The Indian Competition law also follows a leniency regime like the US in the form of a regulation called the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulation, As per the regulation any member from the cartel can file a leniency application with the commission before the Director General files his investigation report and that party can thereafter make full and true disclosure of all the crucial information related to the members of the cartel, duration of the cartel, and the previous profits earned. Such a regime has been an immensely successful endeavour. [85]
• Further the preamble of the Competition Act says “An Act to provide, keeping in view the economic development of the country”. It is to be noted that the preamble creates a clear linkage between the micro-economic functioning of the free market economy and larger development imperatives of the It is to be noted that the competition is not an end in itself but it is a means to achieve the end of greater economic goals.[86]
• Since the year 2020 began the competition commission has been much active in addressing the anti- competitive practices in e-commerce sector. The commission has issued a report titled “Market Study on E-commerce in India” , which lays down the key market players in e-commerce, their features, the competition in this sector, observances and other findings. The report has laid down the approach which the competition commission of India seeks to practice and thus regulate anti-competitive practices in this sector. The CCI has addressed the issues of platform neutrality, platform to business contract terms, platform price parity clauses, deep discounts and exclusive agreements. The report urges the key e- commerce players to have a self-regulatory mechanism for search rankings, collection, use and sharing of data, user review and also rating This is a welcome step towards regulating competition effectively in e-commerce sector.[87]
• The CCI has also been proactively involved in enabling a quick resolution process of cases coming out of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy In 2019 the commission assisted in 77 short form filings and 13 long form filings with many huge deals cleared with remedies.[88]
• The CCI has also brought Regulation 5B to the Combination Regulation through which parties shall be able to acquire shares through public bids or stock exchange thereby effectuating the transaction. The acquirer shall only have to file a notification to the commission. [89]
• The Competition Commission has also expanded its regulatory scope to international affairs also wherein any international deal which has the effect of reducing competition,increasing the prices of products, having an adverse effect upon the domestic players of the country, and also results in retardation of innovative intent, such deals shall be blocked by the commission.
• In cases of anti-competitive agreements the commission has got the power to take action even on a presumption that such agreement has taken place between market entities. However, parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and save themselves. Because such kind of agreements are harmful for the consumers and other market players therefore such agreements have to dealt strictly.

B- BAD CHARACTERISTICS

• The competition law in India has got no established jurisprudence in most substantive issues. The country is long way in developing its jurisprudence on various competition law issues. Since India has young regime, the work is still in progress.
• Under Section 4 of the Act where abuse of dominance has been defined, the Act does not notify the approach which is to be used while determining the abuse of dominance. It has been left for open interpretational choice between the per se approach and the rule of reason.[90]
• The is no speedy disposal of the cases. It takes many years for a case to be decided by the CCI and thereafter if the losing party wants to make an appeal to the COMPAT and then to the Supreme Court, it further takes many years to get their claims addressed. Also, the proceedings are very expensive and complicated. In the case of Competition Commission of India Steel Authority of India (2010), the Supreme Court has held that the proceedings before the Competition shall be disposed of expeditiously, it should take a time shorter than the time period mentioned in the statute[91].
• The competition law in India does not seek to impose criminal liability against Only civil penalties have been mentioned in the Act. This will have a less deterrent effect on the violators. This way the violating parties can easily get away just by paying fines as civil penalty. Only the inclusion of financial punishments and behavioural and structural remedies does not seem sufficient for maintaining a healthy competition law regime in the country.
• The competition law enforcement institutions suffer from a lack of appropriate staffing. in order for the expeditious disposal of cases the staffing in the competition commission should be increased. And also, an endeavour should be made towards including the members who have good knowledge of micro-economics and competition laws. by increasing the strength and expertise of the staff, cases can be disposed of at a much faster pace.
• Unlike the US system antitrust system, India has no separate specialized agency which can monitor and investigate the anti-competitive practices. The Competition Commission of India has got all the duties invested in it thud increasing the workload and slow working procedure. On the other hand there must be specialized agency whose only task should be to investigate and monitor the market competition practices, evaluate the mergers and acquisitions and bring extreme cases before the CCI for disposal.

FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

The competition law regime in India is at a much younger stage than the already established and mature antitrust regime of the US. At the time when India got independence in 1947, the US had already completed 77 years of development of its antitrust law regime. It is high time India must learn from the rich history of the US and incorporate various good practices within its system. India should follow the approach of “to take the best and leave the rest”. Some of the recommendations which can be made are-

• India can incorporate the practice of awarding threefold damages to the violators of competition laws. The competition Act should be amended accordingly and such powers should be given to the competition commission and the COMPAT as well. The private parties who win the case shall be reimbursed the court fee expenses and also shall be awarded three times the amount of loss suffered by This shall have a deterrent effect on the violators.
• Since the CCI has the power of deciding its own procedures and rules, such power can be used to issue policy statements and guidelines which shall disclose in detail as to what type of conduct is undesirable for free market competition, what are methods of determining an anti-competitive conduct, what are other internal mechanisms used to regulate anti- competitive Example can be taken from the Merger guidelines issued by the DOJ and the FTC in the US. This shall help increase the accountability and transparency.
• The staffing of the institutions can be further improved by including a good number of experienced and talented economists and lawyers who can work more efficiently and enthusiastically so as to give a huge impetus to the further shaping of competition law regime in India.
• The statutory provisions of Indian competition law can be made more definite, and unambiguous in nature by a proper amendments and judicial interpretation from time to time.
• Last but not the least India should work towards developing a proper jurisprudence on competition laws and remove the existing vagueness in its laws.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A- BOOKS

• Douglas Broder, U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement- A Practice Introduction, 2, (2010).
• Richard Pierce, The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2026 (2015).
• Status Report: A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program (February 1, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr
• Richard Pierce, The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2026 (2015).
• Status Report: A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program (February 1, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr
• Norman A. Armstrong, Jr., John C. Carroll, and Christopher C. Yook, Sherman Act Section 1 fundaments, Lexis Nexis, 4, 03/05/2019, see https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/006/789/original/Sherman_Act_Section_1_Fundamentals.pdf?155 2681037

B- RESEARCH ARTICLES AND JOURNALS-

• Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comparing the Competition Law Regimes of the United States and India, George Washington University Law School, Research Paper No. 2017-27, 4, (2017).
• Jonida Lamaj, Phd. Candidate, The Evolution of Antitrust Law in US, European Scientific Journal Vol.13, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 788, February 2017.
• George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency- The Growing Reliance on US-style antitrust Settlements in EU, Uthah Law Review Article 4, 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115120
• Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 375 (1970).
• Rahul Singh, Shifting Paradigms, Changing Contexts: Need for a New Competition Law in India, 8 J. Corp. L. Stud. 143 (2008).
• Vijay Kumar Singh, Competition Law and Policy in India: The Journey in a Decade, 4 NUJS L. Rev. 523 (2011).
• Anagh Mishra, Evolution of Competition Law in India, ILS law college Pune: Academia.edu, 9, 2017, 1 https://www.academia.edu/6868820/Evolution_of_Competition_Law_in_India

• Payal Malik, Competition Law in India-Developing Efficient Markets for greater good, SAGE Publications, IIM Ahmedabad, 178,2016.

C- NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND ONLINE BLOGS-

• Norman A. Armstrong, Jr., John C. Carroll, and Christopher C. Yook, Sherman Act Section 1 fundaments, Lexis Nexis,4, 03/05/2019, see https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/006/789/original/Sherman_Act_Section_1_Fundamentals.pdf?155 2681037
• Anagh Mishra, Evolution of Competition Law in India, ILS law college Pune: Academia.edu, 9, 2017, 1 https://www.academia.edu/6868820/Evolution_of_Competition_Law_in_India
• Abir roy and Atul Sharma, CCI v. SAIL (2010)- the Supreme Court gets it right, competition lawyer blog spot, 13 September, 2010, https://competitionlawyer.blogspot.com/2010/09/cci-v-sail-supreme-court-gets-it-html
• The law corner, The Competition Commission of India and the Director General to investigate contraventions, 12 September,2020
• Akriti Gupta, Competition Appellate Tribunal-Overview, Legal bites blog, 2 July, 2020, https://www.legalbites.in/competition-appellate-tribunal
• Anti- Competitive agreements under Competition Law, Vakilno.1.com, 1 Dec,2017
• Mihir Kamdar, Vertical Restraints- the positive effects, India Business Law Journal, 25 May, 2013; Sonam Sharma v. Apple and ors, Case no. 24/2011.
• S. Rana & Co. Advocates, Ola Cab and Allegations of Its Abuse Of Dominant Position, mondaq.com, 4 Dec, 2017.
• Anubhav Pandey, Regulation of Combinations under the Competition Law, iPleaders Blog, 21 April,2018, https://blog.ipleaders.in/combination-under-the-competition-law/
• Mehak Gupta, Penalties for Infringement of Competition Law, internship project report, July, 2012, see http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.651.2174&rep=rep1&type=pdf

FOOTNOTES

[1] See scholarship.law.gwu.edu, GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works | Faculty Scholarship | GeorgeWashington University Law School (gwu.edu)

[2] Douglas Broder, U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement- A Practice Introduction, 2, (2010).

[3] United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).

[4] Douglas Broder, U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement- A Practice Introduction, 15, (2010).

[5] See cci.gov.in, Competition Commission of India,Government of India (cci.gov.in)

[6] Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C., Sec.1, (1890).

[7] Norman A. Armstrong, Jr., John C. Carroll, and Christopher C. Yook, Sherman Act Section 1 fundaments, Lexis Nexis,4,03/05/2019,see https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/006/789/original/Sherman_Act_Section_1_Fundamentals.pdf?155268 1037

[8] See SAGE Journals: Your gateway to world-class research journals (sagepub.com)

[9] See http://economics.fundamentalfinance.com/sherman-act.php

[10] The Clayton Act encompasses 15 U.S.C. §§12–27 and 29 U.S.C. §§52–53

[11] Id. Th e Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, which increased the criminal penalties for violating the antitrust laws also created an important exception to the treble-damage rule. It limited to single damages the civil antitrust liability of those who take advantage of the DOJ’s leniency program by informing the government about antitrust violations in which they participated. Those who do not receive amnesty remain liable for treble damages.

[12]  Id. Th e original Section 7 applied only to stock acquisitions. Th e Cellar-Kefauver Amendments of 1950 extended the application of the act to asset acquisitions.

[13] See Nixon Peabody LLP

[14] 15 U.S.C. §19. Section 8 also prohibits (with exceptions) any director, officer, or employee of any Federal Reserve member bank from also serving as a director, officer, or employee of any other bank. Although this aspect of the section has not been repealed, interlocking bank directorates are now governed by the Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C. §§3201–320

[15] Startseite – Freilaw e.V.

[16] Douglas Broder, U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement- A Practice Introduction, 20, (2010).

[17] nixonpeabody.com

[18] Supra note 17.

[19] Supra note 11, at 21.

[20] Supra note 11, at 23.

[21] Richard Pierce, The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2026 (2015).

[22]  See GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works | Faculty Scholarship | George Washington University Law School (gwu.edu)

[23]  Status Report: A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program (February 1, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr

[24]  Douglas Broder, U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement- A Practice Introduction, 177-188, (2010).

[25]  Federal Trade Commission official site, https://www.ftc.gov/

[26] Federal Trade Commission official site, https://www.ftc.gov/

[27] United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).

[28] Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comparing the Competition Law Regimes of the United States and India, George Washington University Law School, Research Paper No. 2017-27, 4, (2017).

[29] Supra note 20, at 4.

[30]  Supra note 20, at 3.

[31] Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46. See also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)

[32] Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comparing the Competition Law Regimes of the United States and India, George Washington University Law School, Research Paper No. 2017-27, 4, (2017).

[33] Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comparing the Competition Law Regimes of the United States and India, George Washington University Law School, Research Paper No. 2017-27, 4, (2017).

[34] 5 U.S.C. §53(b), see also United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).

[35] Jonida Lamaj, Phd. Candidate, The Evolution of Antitrust Law in US, European Scientific Journal Vol.13, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 788, February 2017.

[36] DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/

[37] George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency- The Growing Reliance on US-style antitrust Settlements in EU, Uthah Law Review Article no. 4, 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115120

[38] The first U.S. antitrust consent decree was entered in 1906 in United States v. Otis Elevator Co., reported in 1 DECREES & JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES 107 (N.D. Cal. 1906).

[39] Supra note 29, at 36; see also Antitrust Act, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 16(a) (2006)).

[40] Supra note 29, at 36.

[41] Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 375 (1970).

[42] Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

[43] See, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding a merger unlawful because it would create a firm with 4.5 per cent of a market in which 970 other firms participate).

[44] Supra note 33, at 1009.

[45] See eg. Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477.

[46] United States v. Alcoa, 148 F. 3d 416 (1945).

[47] See E.g.- Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).

[48] Richard Pierce, The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2030-31, (2015).

[49] Supra note 40, at 2031.

[50] Shreeya, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1970, 30 August,2018, https://blog.ipleaders.in/mrtp/#_ftn23

[51] Ministry of Human Resources and Development (MHRD), Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in India, E-Pathshala.

[52] Rahul Singh, Shifting Paradigms, Changing Contexts: Need for a New Competition Law in India, 8 J. Corp. L. Stud. 143 (2008).

[53] Vijay Kumar Singh, Competition Law and Policy in India: The Journey in a Decade, 4 NUJS L. Rev. 523 (2011).

[54]CAREER DEVELOPMENT (mbaedu2014.blogspot.com)

[55] Anagh Mishra, Evolution of Competition Law in India, ILS law college Pune: Academia.edu, 9, 2017, 55

https://www.academia.edu/6868820/Evolution_of_Competition_Law_in_India

[56] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, “The Competition Act,2002”, The Gazette of India, No.12, January 14, 2003

[57] See Shodhganga : a reservoir of Indian theses @ INFLIBNET

[58] Supra note 47.

[59] Student paper submitted to The WB National University of Juridical Sciences.

[60] Abir roy and Atul Sharma, CCI v. SAIL (2010)- the Supreme Court gets it right, competition lawyer blog spot, 13 September, 2010, https://competitionlawyer.blogspot.com/2010/09/cci-v-sail-supreme-court-gets-it-right.html 61 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, “The Competition Act,2002”, The Gazette of India, No.12, January 14, 2003

[61] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, “The Competition Act,2002”, The Gazette of India, No.12, January 14, 2003

[62] Supra note 50.

[63] The law corner, The Competition Commission of India and the Director General to investigate contraventions, 12 September,2020

[64] Akriti Gupta, Competition Appellate Tribunal-Overview, Legal bites blog, 2 July, 2020, https://www.legalbites.in/competition-appellate-tribunal

[65] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, “The Competition Act,2002”, The Gazette of India, No.12, January 14, 2003

[66] See The Competition Act, 2002, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173221377/

[67] Anti- Competitive agreements under Competition Law, Vakilno.1.com, 1 Dec,2017

[68] Mihir Kamdar, Vertical Restraints- the positive effects, India Business Law Journal, 25 May, 2013; Sonam Sharma v. Apple and ors, Case no. 24/2011.

[69] Submitted to GGS IP University Delhi

[70] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, “The Competition Act,2002”, The Gazette of India, No.12, Section 4, January 14, 2003

[71] See iiprd.wordpress.com

[72] Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd & Meru Travel Services Pvt Ltd v. ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd, 2015, Case No. 6 & 74 of 2015.

[73] S.S. Rana & Co. Advocates, Ola Cab and Allegations of Its Abuse Of Dominant Position, mondaq.com, 4 Dec, 2017.

[74] See Vakilno1.com – India Law, Online Legal Advice, Legal Documents, Forms

[75] See journals.sagepub.com.

[76] S.V.S. Raghavan Committee Report (2000). Report of High- Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law (section 4.5 p. 38), https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition _policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf

[77] See LexWalk – Legal Ignorance is Legal Exploitation

[78] Anubhav Pandey, Regulation of Combinations under the Competition Law, iPleaders Blog, 21 April,2018, https://blog.ipleaders.in/combination-under-the-competition-law/

[79] See citeseerx.ist.psu.edu

[80] Mehak Gupta, Penalties for Infringement of Competition Law, internship project report, July, 2012, see http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.651.2174&rep=rep1&type=pdf

[81] Ahilya Pusalkar, Criminal Sanctions for the enforcement of competition law-An Analysis of issues and challenges, Legal Services India, 2020, see http://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-3247-criminal-sanctions- for-enforcement-of-competition-law-an-analysis-of-issues-and-challenges.html

[82] STA Law Firm, CCI and Regulations Governing Cartels, mondaq.com 19 May, 2020, see https://www.mondaq.com/india/cartels-monopolies/936392/competition-commission-in-india-and-regulations- governing-cartels-

[83] Tejaswa Naswa, Surinder Singh Barmi v. BCCI: analysis of the competition law principles, khelAdhikar.com 21 july, 2018, see https://kheladhikar.com/2018/07/21/surinder-singh-barmi-v-bcci-analysis-of-the-competition- law-principles/

[84] Google Inc. & Ors vs Competition Commission of India and others, LPA No.733/2014, decided on 27 April, 2015, see https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190415917/

[85] STA Law Firm, Competition Commission in India and Regulations Governing Cartels, 19 may, 2020, see https://www.mondaq.com/india/cartels-monopolies/936392/competition-commission-in-india-and-regulations- governing-cartels-

[86] Payal Malik, Competition Law in India-Developing Efficient Markets for greater good, SAGE Publications, IIM Ahmedabad, 2016.

[87] Soumya Hariharan, Nandita Sahai, and Sakshi Agarwal, Competition Law in India: a work in progress, Business Today, 17 January,2020, see https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/competition-law-in-india-a- work-in-progress-cci-ecommerce-sector-corporate/story/394066.html

[88]  Supra note 70.

[89] supra note 70.

[90] Payal Malik, Competition Law in India-Developing Efficient Markets for greater good, SAGE Publications, IIM Ahmedabad, 178, 2016.

[91] Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Another (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 744, CIVIL APPEAL NO.7779 OF 2010, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/864375/